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Abstract Although there are a handful of studies on
business angel investment returns, the business an-
gel literature has given little or no attention to exits
and the exit strategy. This is surprising given that a
primary objective of investing is to achieve a capital
gain through some form of liquidity event. Using the
theory of planned behaviour (TPB) as an interpreta-
tive heuristic, we examine how exits happen: spe-
cifically, what are the motivations to seek an exit
and to what extent are they planned or opportunis-
tic? Based on multiple case studies in which busi-
ness angels were invited to tell the story of their
most recent exit(s), the evidence suggests that the
majority of liquidity events are the outcome of
planned behaviour. We propose a typology of
angel-backed investment exits as the basis for iden-
tifying future directions for research and developing
practical advice to angels on effective business
practices.
Keywords Business angels . Harvest event .
Entrepreneurial exit . Investment returns . Theory of
planned behaviour
JEL Classification D91 . G23 . G24 . L26 .M13
1 Introduction
The exit is where you get your money back, you
hope, with return, even better, and possibly a very
good return, better still. (Cowley 2018)1
Keep in mind that angel investors invest for
returns.2
Business angels achieve their financial returns through
exits. They make investments in early stage companies,
usually taking a minority stake, and rely on the entrepre-
neurs they back to deliver value. But they only achieve a
financial return when their shares are sold. This requires a
‘liquidity event’, normally through the acquisition of their
investee company by another company. Moreover, they
are looking for a large return. This is because early stage
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investing is high risk so they need some of their invest-
ments to generate a substantial return to compensate for
their other investments that either fail or perform just well
enough to keep in business but not sufficiently well to be
able to attract a buyer. Yet despite the centrality of the exit
to business angel investing, it has been largely ignored in
both the academic and practitioner literatures. Research
on entrepreneurial exits (e.g. DeTienne 2010; Wennberg
et al. 2010; DeTienne and Cardon 2012; Wennberg and
DeTienne 2014) has taken an entrepreneur-centric per-
spective and ignored investor exits. And, as recent re-
views of the business angel literature indicate, there have
been few studies of the exit stage in the investment
process (Edelman et al. 2017; Wallmeroth et al. 2018;
Tenca et al. 2018), with these studies largely focused on
investment returns (Mason and Harrison 2002; Wiltbank
and Boeker 2007; Wiltbank 2009; Wiltbank et al. 2009;
McDonald and DeGennaro 2016; Gregson et al. 2017).
However, the process by which business angels achieve
exits—specifically, the extent to which they were the
outcome of a planned strategy or an opportunistic re-
sponse to circumstances—represents an important ques-
tion which we cannot answer at present. From a practi-
tioner perspective, Basil Peters—a fund manager, angel
investor and exit coach—observes that “exits are the least
understood part of investing, as often by the investors
themselves as by the entrepreneurs” (Peters 2009, p. 15).
Various studies have found that business angels give
little thought to future exit routes, do not have exit plans
at the time of investing and are relaxed about the timing
of the exit (Wetzel 1981; Gaston 1989; Harrison and
Mason 1992; Landström 1993; Mason and Harrison
1994; Lumme et al. 1998; Harrison et al. 2016). For
example, Collewaert (2012, p. 755) comments that the
“angel investor exit is often unplanned and many angels
do not have a clear exit route preference.” Indeed, a
common view amongst business angels is that “good
investments will find their own exits” (cited in Mason
et al. 2016). Furthermore, helping to prepare the business
for an exit is not a significant post-investment role that
angels play in their investee companies (Politis 2008).
However, with the growing professionalisation of angel
investing in the form of managed angel groups (Mason
et al. 2013, 2016), more attention is now being given to the
exit, particularly amongst the practitioner community (e.g.
Peters 2009; McKaskill 2009; Mason et al. 2015). Angel
groups—which typically have between 25 and 75 mem-
bers but some have over 100 members—enable individual
angels to invest collectively. Members have a wide range
of industry backgrounds but are mostly entrepreneurs,
business professionals and senior executives (Mason and
Botelho 2014). A manager—who may be one of the
members or a hired professional—typically undertakes
the initial screening of investment opportunities and man-
ages investor engagement. However, each business angel
makes their own investment decisions. The emergence of
angel groups reflects the need for greater financial re-
sources to make larger investments, including follow-on
investments, beyond what most individual angels would
be willing to commit as the focus of venture capital funds
has shifted to larger deals. Because of their greater financial
resources, angel groups are more likely to fund their
investments to an exit, via follow-on investments
(Harrison et al. 2010). Angel groups are attractive to
individual investors by offering superior deal flow and
lowering the risk of investing by enabling them to achieve
more diversified investment portfolios, providing access to
better due diligence and more effective post-investment
support and giving the opportunity to learn from more
experienced investors (Mason et al. 2019). Groups appoint
one of their members to act as a non-executive director in
each investee company and provide appropriate hands-on
support and advice (Mason et al. 2016). Angel groups are
much more focused on exits than individual angels be-
cause of the need both to give their members liquidity to
make further investments and to be able to attract new
members (Mason et al. 2015). Entrepreneurs are also
advised that they must be able to articulate an exit strategy
in their pitches to angels (Loehr 2016; Berry n.d.). So, for
these reasons, we would expect to see a more proactive
emphasis on the exit process than in the past.
As the first attempt to open the exit ‘black box’, this
paper follows the tradition adopted by Wetzel (1983) in
his pioneering studies of business angels which had the
objective of “putting boundaries on our ignorance”. The
paper asks the following research question: To what
extent is the exit the outcome of a planned or an oppor-
tunistic strategy by an angel investor? We follow
McDonald and DeGennaro (2016) in distinguishing
between two types of ‘termination events’: (i) exits,
which are outcomes in which the investor recovers all
their original investment plus a premium (e.g. through
an IPO, trade sale to third party investors or manage-
ment share buy-back), and (ii) expirations, where the
investment is written off or generates zero returns, typ-
ically as a result of the closure of the business.
This distinction recognises, a priori, that these two
types of event are different in terms of investor
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intentions and behaviours. While investors aspire to
achieve exits, and may act in such a way as to realise
these aspirations, they do not aspire to, or work towards,
expirations. Planning an exit is an integral part of a
venture capitalist’s decision to invest in an entrepreneur-
ial firm (given the need to generate returns for the
limited partners (LPs) in their funds), and the exit route
is a joint decision (but also a potential point of difference
or conflict) between the investor and entrepreneur (el
Bouzaidi 2015, p. 90). For angel investors, who are not
driven by the need to generate returns to LPs, generating
positive returns (i.e. exits) is a key motivation for
investing, but one which may be pursued passively
rather than actively (Harrison et al. 2016). We also
recognise that for most angel investors, exits and expi-
rations represent only a minority of their investments,
with a majority of their investee businesses generating
sufficient revenues to stay in business but not
performing well enough to attract a buyer. For example,
Go Beyond, a European angel group based in Switzer-
land with members from 45 countries, has made invest-
ments in 98 companies since it started investing in 2008,
achieving 9 successful exits; 10 investments had failed
and 79 companies were still in their portfolio (Go Be-
yond 2019). In other words, exits—the intended out-
come of angel investing—are relatively rare events.
While the general expectation of capital gains is a
major driver of angel investing and can provide the
opportunity and means to recycle resources into further
investments, only around one-quarter of investors have
a clear exit strategy at the point of making the invest-
ment and the exit is low on the list of influences on the
investment decision (Landström 1998; Mason and
Botelho 2016; Mason and Harrison 2003; Van
Osnabrugge 1998). Furthermore, recent research has
demonstrated that most investors are patient (that is,
they have a long-term orientation in terms of holding
period for their investments) by default, in the absence
of exit opportunities, rather than intent (Harrison et al.
2016), implying an opportunistic rather than strategic
approach to the exit. However, the exit process itself has
not been subject to detailed scrutiny to date, a gap in our
understanding of the angel investment process which
this paper seeks to rectify. In doing so, we follow the call
of Maula et al. (2005) for more research into angel
investing from a theory of planned behaviour perspec-
tive. Accordingly, using the theory of planned behaviour
(TPB) (Ajzen 1988, 1991) as an interpretative heuristic,
we examine the argument that exits are the outcome of
planned strategic decisions (Peters 2009; McKaskill
2009), drawing on evidence from 17 case studies of
angel-backed companies where the angel was able to
achieve an exit. On the basis of our exploratory analysis,
we develop a typology of exits and highlight key re-
search questions for future work.
2 Literature review
2.1 Angel exits as planned behaviour
The implication of adopting an exit-centric approach to
investing is that it requires a commitment to carrying out
an action or actions in the future and requires planning
and forethought (Hayward et al. 2017). This, in turn,
suggests that the exit process can be examined through
the lens of the TPB (Ajzen 1988, 1991). This theory, an
extension of the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein and
Ajzen 1975), is an expectancy-value model of attitude–
behaviour relationships which details the determinants
of an individual’s decision to enact a particular behav-
iour and is designed to provide parsimonious explana-
tions of informational and motivational influences on
behaviour (Conner and Armitage 1998). As a delibera-
tive processing (cognition-based) model, TPB assumes
that individuals make decisions based on careful con-
siderations of the available information, and it specifi-
cally addresses behaviour or situations where individ-
uals have incomplete ability or control to exercise their
own will (Ajzen 1988, 1991, 2002). It proposes that
volitional human behaviour is a proximal function of
the individual’s intention to perform the behaviour,
where intentions represent the individual’s motivation
that is their conscious decision or plan to exert effort to
enact the behaviour. Based on the principle of compat-
ibility (Fishbein and Ajzen 1975), intentions and behav-
iour are strongly related when measured at the same
level of specificity in regard to the action, target, context
and timeframe and under the condition that the time
interval between intention and behaviour is short
enough to ensure that intentions have not changed
(Conner and Armitage 1998). The TPB also addresses
the predictability of nonvolitional behaviours by incor-
porating perceptions of the control over performance of
the behaviour as a predictor. As such, the theory ad-
dresses not just easily performed volitional behaviours
but also complex goals and outcomes “which are de-
pendent upon performance of a complex series of other
behaviours” (Conner and Armitage 1998, p. 1430).
Echoing Bandura’s (1982) self-efficacy construct, the
theory posits that behaviour is a function of behavioural
intentions and perceived behavioural control (PBC), the
individual’s perception of the extent to which perfor-
mance of the behaviour is easy or difficult (Ajzen 1991)
and their own ability to perform that behaviour. This
control can be viewed as a continuum from easily exe-
cuted behaviours at one end and those, such as the angel
exit, requiring resources, opportunities and specialised
skills at the other.
Our application of TPB as a perspective on angel
exits is justified on two grounds. First, it identifies the
central link between intentions and behaviour, which
reflects the fact that people tend to engage in behaviours
they intend to perform. In the case of angel investment,
therefore, the intention to exit will be reflected in the
investor engaging in exit behaviour—the exit will be a
strategic choice, actively pursued. Second, the link be-
tween PBC and behaviour suggests individuals are more
likely to engage in desirable behaviours over which they
have control and will be prevented from enacting be-
haviours over which they have no control. Equally,
subject to intentions being held constant, as PBC in-
creases so the likelihood of the behaviour being per-
formed will also increase. In the case of angel exits,
PBC allows us to distinguish between those exits that
are intentional and those that are driven by other inter-
ests, such as pressure from the founder or other investors
(notably venture capitalists), where the angel might find
the exit imposed on them. In this respect, it is apposite to
note that angel research is ambivalent on the extent to
which angel investors think in portfolio, rather than deal
to deal, terms, although the rise in the significance of
angel groups is likely to increase the prevalence of
portfolio thinking (Gregson et al. 2013, 2017; Mason
et al. 2016). Nevertheless, it remains the case that the
exit is considered on an investment-specific basis and
that typically the exit process will be led by the angel,
for two reasons. First, angels typically invest at earlier
stages than institutional investors, which helps to build a
relationship with the entrepreneur. This will lead to the
angel being the first external ‘influence’ on the entre-
preneur's actions. Second, despite the possibility of con-
flict in the angel–entrepreneur relationship (Collewaert
2012), there is substantial evidence that angels want to
achieve exits (Harrison et al. 2016) and that there is a
very strong alignment between all agents involved (an-
gels, entrepreneurs and other investors).
According to TPB, an individual’s intentions are
determined by their attitudes towards the behaviour,
subjective norms and perceived control over the behav-
iour (PBC). Each of these in turn has determinants (the
indirect determinants of intentions). First, attitudes are
the overall evaluations of the behaviour by the individ-
ual and specifically those towards performance of the
behaviour. Attitude is in turn a function of the individ-
ual’s salient behavioural beliefs, that is their perceived
outcomes or attributes of the behaviour. In expectancy-
value terms, outcomes are the combination “of the per-
ceived likelihood that performance of the behaviour will
lead to a particular outcome and evaluation of that
outcome” (Conner and Armitage 1998, p. 1431). Sec-
ond, subjective norms comprise an individual’s beliefs
about whether significant others (those whose prefer-
ences about an individual’s behaviour in this domain are
important to them) think they should enact the behav-
iour. These subjective norms are assumed to represent
the social pressures on individuals to perform or not
perform a particular behaviour. These in turn are deter-
mined by normative beliefs, the perceptions of “specific
significant others’ preferences about whether one should
or should not engage in the behaviour,… the subjective
likelihood that specific salient groups or individuals
(referents) think the person should or should not per-
form the behaviour,…[and] … the person’s motivation
to comply with that referent” (Conner and Armitage
1998, p. 1431–1432). This is particularly relevant in a
business angel group context, where the investment
decisions of individual members may be influenced by
other investors (Mason et al. 2019). Here, the subjective
norm captures the effect of other investors’ views on a
particular opportunity and/or action (e.g. invest, rein-
vest, exit, etc…). Third, PBC, the individual’s percep-
tion of their own ability to perform that behaviour, is
itself influenced by control beliefs concerning “whether
one has access to the necessary resources and opportu-
nities to perform the behaviour successfully, weighted
by the perceived power of each factor to facilitate or
inhibit behaviour” (Conner and Armitage 1998, p.
1432). These control beliefs can be internal control
factors (e.g. information, skills, emotions, personal de-
ficiencies) or external control factors (e.g. opportunities,
barriers, dependence on others). Further, the degree to
which PBC directly influences behaviour (rather than
indirectly through intention) depends on the degree of
actual control over the behaviour, and individuals who
perceive that they have access to the necessary resources
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and believe that there are opportunities or lack of obsta-
cles to perform the behaviour are likely to have high
levels of PBC (Ajzen 1991).
As an illustration of how this might be applied to the
angel exit process, consider the situation of a business in
which the angel(s) is invested alongside an institutional
VC investor. In such circumstances, there may be impor-
tant legal concerns that limit the business angel's ability to
exit, including tag-along rights, right of first refusal, and
other shareholder consent requirements that might limit
an individual business angel’s management/behavioural
options and exit opportunities. There may also be ques-
tions concerning the discount that the business angel
might have to concede to realise the exit and valuation
concerns as a signalling for future rounds. All of these
external control factors would be reflected in a low PBC
on the part of the angel investor.
The basic TPB model developed by Ajzen (1988) is
shown in Fig. 1. In addition, TPB makes a number of
mediating hypotheses. First, the effect of attitude and
subjective norm on behaviour is fully, and that of PBC
on behaviour, partially mediated by intention, such that
as a general rule, the more favourable the attitude and
the subjective norm, and the greater the perceived con-
trol, the stronger should the person’s intention to per-
form the behaviour in question. Second, the effect of all
other cultural, environmental, biological, social and eco-
nomic influences is hypothesised to be mediated by the
TPB, a sufficiency assumption that has been subject to
some criticism (Sniehotta et al. 2014).
The TPB has been extensively applied in entrepre-
neurship research over the past 20 years or so (Fig. 2),
primarily to examine entrepreneurial intentions in the
venture creation context (Schlaegel and Koening 2014;
Lortie and Castrogiovanni 2015). This is on the basis
that entrepreneurial activity, such as the launch of a
nascent business, is a planned event not a conditioned
response to a stimulus (Krueger et al. 2000). It is, in
other words, “an intentional process in which individ-
uals cognitively plan to carry out the behaviours of
opportunity recognition, venture creation, and venture
development” (Lortie and Castrogiovanni 2015, p. 2).
While much of the entrepreneurship applications of the
TPB have cut up, compartmentalised and fragmented
the theory (Lortie and Castrogiovanni 2015), there is
general consensus that there is a link between intentions
and subsequent behaviours (Schlaegel and Koening
2014; Armitage and Conner 2001). Specifically, the 42
papers reviewed by Lortie and Castrogiovanni (2015)
do confirm the relationship between attitudes and inten-
tions, PBC and intentions and intentions to behaviours.
However, the link from subjective norms to intentions
was rather less well supported. The one relationship that
does not receive widespread attention in the entrepre-
neurship literature is that between PBC and behaviour.
The one study reviewed that does find such support is a
study of the role of PBC specifically on the decision to
make an informal investment which concludes that atti-
tudes, skills and experience are more important than
investor demographics and suggests the TPB frame-
work is therefore applicable in explaining informal in-
vestment behaviour (Maula et al. 2005). Very few stud-
ies in entrepreneurship have applied or tested TPB in its
entirety: of the papers included in one recent review,
38% analysed the link between attitudes and intention,
33% that between subjective norms and intentions and
54% that between PBC and intentions; only 31% looked
at the link between intentions and behaviour and only
7% (3 papers) examined the non-mediated link between
PBC and behaviour (Lortie and Castrogiovanni 2015).
Furthermore, the majority of applications of TPB in
entrepreneurship have focused on explaining intentions
in the venture creation context, with fewer applications
in the explanation of behaviour or in the context of
venture development (Table 1) or wider entrepreneurial
contexts such as opportunity recognition, innovation,
angel investment, entrepreneurial networking and entre-
preneurial turnover and exit (Ramos-Rodriguez et al.
2010; Montalvo 2006; Maula et al. 2005; Vissa 2011;
Brigham et al. 2007). We add to this literature by using
TPB as a lens to examine a behaviour—the business
angel’s exit strategy—not hitherto studied using this
framework. In so doing, we are responding to calls for
more entrepreneurship research to explore the connec-
tions between intentions and planning, to investigate
more specifically the PBC–behaviour link and to make
more use of qualitative approaches such as interviews
(Lortie and Castrogiovanni 2015, p. 951).
Beyond entrepreneurship, there has been consider-
able criticism and debate over the methodology, validity
and utility of the TPB (for example, see French and
Hankins 2003; Sniehotta et al. 2014; Gollwitzer and
Oettingen 2015; Schwarzer 2015; Rhodes 2015; Ajzen
2015; Hagger 2015; Armitage 2015; Connor 2015).
Given this, we treat TPB as an interpretative heuristic,
where the ‘successful exit’ is the problem to be
explained and TPB is the heuristic to explain that. This
follows approaches recommended in philosophy and the
philosophy of science. Specifically, we follow Schwab
(1962, 1974) in recognising that there is an important
epistemological distinction between the methodological
(empirical data) and interpretative (heuristic principles)
components of scientific knowledge: given the incom-
plete treatment of TPB to date in the entrepreneurship
literature, relative to other discipline areas, its use as an
interpretative heuristic is justified. This is reinforced by
the recognition, in an extension to Simon’s (1990)
bounded rationality argument, that the interpretative
heuristic is central to problem solving: it is an adaptive
characteristic of the human cognitive system which
guarantees cognitive economy when meanings and re-
lations are familiar, permitting their recognition. In sit-
uations where meanings and relations are unusual, and
the usual interpretations will not work, the interpretative
heuristic represents the exploration of other ways of
interpreting the problem in a search for possible rela-
tions between the parts and the whole. As a result, “the
original representation of the data changes when a new
relation is discovered, […] The same data, seen in a
different light, provide a view that is different to the
default, the original starting point. […] new relations are
found by exploring different interpretations, and not by
exhaustive searches or abstractions” (Macchi and
Bagassi 2014, p. 106). As such, our approach to TPB
in this paper is to use the theory to interpret the social
world of the business angel investor. We treat the theory
as a perspective, a “point of understanding to sort out the
buzzing confusions and complexities of the social
world” (Spicer 2008, p. 47). As such, the moment of
doing theory becomes not one of establishing causal
relations to predict behaviours and outcomes, but one
of trying to generate a meaningful understanding of the
business angel’s world. It is, in other words, an effort to
understand and recover their patterns of meaning and
interpretation of actions, to root out the practical knowl-
edge of the actors as they go through the social world
(Spicer 2008).
3 Research design
The research follows a case study approach. This re-
search strategy is commonly applied in social sciences
(Berg and Lune 2004) and is prominent in the field of
entrepreneurship (Neergaard and Ulhøi 2007). It is par-
ticularly useful for exploratory research where the goal
is to identify the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ (Yin 2014).
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 548–549) also advocates the use
of case studies, and multiple case studies in particular,
claiming that they are “particularly well suited to new
research areas or research areas for which existing the-
ory seems inadequate”. Garg and Eisenhardt (2017)
suggest that this approach is suitable when the re-
searchers aim to understand a process question.
Fig. 1 The pure form of the
theory of planned behaviour.
Source: Shih and Fang (2004),
adapted from (Ajzen 1988, 1991)
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Fig. 2 Number of citations for “theory of planned behaviour” and
entrepreneurship. Source: Google Scholar. Note: 2018 data correct
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There are various case study approaches. This study
adopts a multiple-case holistic approach with one unit of
analysis (Yin 2014)—the process of successfully exiting
from an investment. According to Yin (2014, p. 50), this
research design “is advantageous when no logical sub-
units can be identified or when the relevant theory
underlying the case study is itself of a holistic nature”.
As noted previously, the exit process has been largely
ignored in business angel research.
The unit of analysis and focus of the research is on
the nature of the exit process in successful exits to
identify what were the commonalities in terms of inves-
tor behaviour and how these influence the exit outcome.
A first layer of study questions was designed to under-
stand how exits are achieved in angel-backed companies
and what is the role of business angels in the exit
process. Hence, participants were asked to elaborate
the process by which they thought about the exit (when,
how, why, involvement, drivers). With the objective of
achieving a deeper understanding of the exit process, a
second layer of study questions was designed to focus
on understanding if an exit is achieved through proac-
tive strategy or is it opportunistic, and what influences
the intention of being actively involved in achieving an
exit. This second layer of questions had a strategic focus
to: (i) understand how much the exit was the result of a
particular strategy, (ii) identify the particular actions
undertaken by participants as the exit process unfolds
and (iii) comprehend how external factors (time, market
conditions, funding options, etc.) can impact the angel
investors’ strategic decisions.
3.1 Sample and data collection
The choice of which cases to study is not a straightfor-
ward decision (Stake 2005). In this study, this decision
was devolved to the participants who were asked to
select and then talk through one or two of their most
recent exits. The selection of cases was constrained by
the general lack of exits by business angels. Our previ-
ous studies of angel group managers and individual
angels had asked each of them how many exits they
had achieved (Mason et al. 2013). This provided an
initial sample of angels who had experienced an exit
and were therefore potential participants in this stage of
the study. We also examined the websites of angel
groups to identify any exits that had been achieved.
Additional angels were identified using snowballing
sampling, defined by Biernacki and Waldorf (1981, p.
151) as a technique to “contact one participant via the
other”. Using these three approaches resulted in the
identification of six angel groups and 16 individual
angels with exits. Eisenhardt (1989) recognises that in
case study research, random samples might be neither
essential nor desirable; hence, this convenience sample
should not be seen as a study limitation.
Four angel groups were contacted. The two other
groups with exits were excluded for two reasons: (1)
the nature of the investment was not a typical angel
investment (property deal) and (2) the group had ceased
its angel investment activities (transforming itself into a
publicly listed investment fund). Three of the four
groups agreed to take part in the research. The executive
member responsible for that specific investment was
interviewed. In total, the angel group investments
accounted for six cases, derived from interviews with
four angel group executives from three angel groups.
The recruitment of individual angels had to satisfy the
condition that the investor had played a leading role in
the exited investment. Passive investors—by defini-
tion—would not have been in a position to influence a
company’s decisions and unlikely to be fully aware of
the reasons behind the decisions made during the exit
process. Four of the angels contacted satisfied this con-
dition. Only one of these investors agreed to be
interviewed. Five individual angels were recruited
Table 1 Domain applications of TPB in entrepreneurship (number of papers, n = 42)
Entrepreneurship category
Venture creation Venture development
TPB category Intentions 21 2
Behaviours 6 5
Note: Only 36 papers are classified. The remainder includewider entrepreneurial contexts such as opportunity recognition, innovation, angel
investment, entrepreneurial networking, and entrepreneurial turnover and exit (Ramos-Rodriguez et al. 2010; Montalvo 2006; Maula et al.
2005; Vissa 2011; Brigham et al. 2007). Source: Lortie and Castrogiovanni (2015)
through snowballing. In summary, the study is based on
a convenience sample of 17 case studies of exited in-
vestments, involving ten different investors. All of the
investors were based in the UK.
Table 2 summarises the characteristics of the exited
investments. It is clear that the sample is diverse as
reflected in the control variables used, enabling us to
gain rich insights on investors’ behaviour. The ages of
the oldest and youngest firms span a period of 15 years.
They come from different industries. The stage at which
the firms raised angel investment is consistent with
previous studies (Mason and Harrison 2010, 2011), with
approximately 40% of the firms funded at the start-up
stage. Additionally, the average holding period to exit of
this sample (7.25 years) is in line with previous studies.
Sixteen of the 17 exits were achieved through trade sales
which is also consistent with prior research (e.g. Mason
and Harrison 2002).
3.2 Case analysis
The analysis follows previous research (Meyer 2001;
Karlsen 2007) which uses a four-stage process that
involves establishing the chronology, coding and writ-
ing up the data according to phases and themes, com-
paring the cases and applying the theory. Eisenhardt
(1989) justifies this procedure as a way to accelerate
cross-case appraisal.
In the first step, one of the authors organised the data
of each case chronologically. This was done by
categorising and numbering the different documents
for each case. The following step was to code the data
into themes that would reproduce the contextual factors.
The coded statements were then grouped together under
the appropriate themes. The themes used to code the
data were derived from TPB. This thematic approach
enabled the patterns emerging from each ‘story’ to be
identified (Miles and Huberman 2003). The third step
was to verify the differences and the commonalities
across the cases. Eisenhardt (1989) justifies this practice
to increase the fit between theory and data. The final
step was to evaluate what had emerged in the previous
stages with the current theory regarding business angel
exits. This was achieved by analytic generalisation. Yin
(2014, p. 31–33) describes this process as follows: “in
analytic generalization, the investigator is striving to
generalize a particular set of results to some broader
theory”. This approach is particularly useful when the
objective is to generalise to a theory of a phenomenon
being studied. However, this is not a search for statistical
representativeness to generalise a rule that was found in
the sample to a population. Rather, the rational for this
approach is to link the findings with existing theory in
order to contribute to a general theory of the topic
(Becker 1990). Each case was independently analysed
by at least two of the three authors, and the interpreta-
tions were then shared and further compared with the
remaining cases.
Rowley (2002, p. 24) presents four principles that
should be followed to help in the analysis of case
studies. First, the analysis makes use of all the
relevant evidence. Second, the analysis considers
all of the major rival interpretations and explores
each of them in turn. Third, the analysis should
address the most significant aspect of the case study.
Last, the analysis should draw on the prior expert
knowledge of the researcher(s) in the area of the
case study, but in an unbiased and objective manner.
This set of procedures was adopted to enable an in-
depth understanding of the study findings. Addition-
ally, representative quotes (power quotes in Pratt’s
(2008) terms) relating to the identified themes were
used to help illustrate the results (Ryan and Bernard
2000). The contrasting perspectives of all partici-
pants were taken into account and discussed indi-
vidually. This involved presenting every participant
at the end at every interview with the set of inter-
pretations that the research team had reached. This
reduced the risk of missing rival interpretations. It is
important to emphasise that this course of action
helped not only to verify possible rival interpreta-
tions but also to develop a theoretical framework
that is presented in the final section of the paper.
To increase the validity of results and minimise recall
bias, the research design followed the suggestions of
Miller et al. (1997). First, we asked for the most recent
exit: the majority (71%) occurring within the previous 5
years from the time of the interviews; second, during the
interviews, in situations where participants did not recall
the reasons for a decision they were encouraged to say
that they did not remember. Additionally, the interview
data were complemented by internal and external
sources of information, when available, from company
websites, angel group websites, newspapers, tech
websites and Company’s House to increase the reliabil-
ity and validity of the research and enable the identifi-
cation of any ex-post rationalisation by investors
(Puhakka 2017; Vaivio 2008).
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4 Research findings
The case studies were analysed around four themes that
underpin TPB. The first theme, investor’s intentions to exit
an investment, is influenced by three factors. First is the
attitude of investors towards the exit. Second, intentions to
exit are influenced by subjective norms. This theme eval-
uates the investor’s perception of social pressure (entrepre-
neurs, investors) to pursue the exit. The third theme is
perceived behavioural control which assesses the inves-
tor’s perception of their own capability to achieve the exit.
All these factors were coded as themes.
4.1 Attitudes
Previous research has indicated that, contrary tomuch of
the practitioner comment, business angels typically rate
the exit as low as an investment criterion (e.g. Mason
and Harrison 2003; Mason and Botelho 2016), and
certainly much lower than venture capital fund man-
agers do (Van Osnabrugge 2000). This is associated
with the idea that business angels are providers of pa-
tient capital (Harrison et al. 2016). There is recent evi-
dence that—perhaps surprisingly—most angel group
managers also do not take a particularly exit-centric
Table 2 Characteristics of the case study exits
Participant Case Started Sector Stage £
invested
Investment Exit Other
investorsa
Type of
exit
Multiple Deal
sourceb
(a) Investments by individual angels
P2 C3 2000 Software for mobile
and oil industry
Growth
stage
375k 2011 2013 B Trade
sale
2.1 PC
P2 C4 1993 Medical software Seed 40k 1994 2006 VC, CoIF Trade
sale
25 PC
P3 C5 2005 Education Early
stage
50k 2007 2014 BAs, CoIF Trade
sale
4 PC
P3 C6 2001 Software for mobile
industry
Start-up 80k 2001 2011 BAs, CoIF Trade
sale
8 PC
P7 C11 1996 Finance Seed 100k 1997 2004 BAs, B Trade
sale
24 PC
P7 C12 1995 Industrials Early
stage
275k 2002 2012 BAs, VC Trade
sale
1.1 PC
P8 C13 2003 Software for mobile Seed 150k 2004 2009 BAs, VC,
CoIF
Trade
sale
10 PC
P8 C14 2006 Data software
management
Start-up 175k 2009 2014 BAs, Corp Trade
sale
6 AG
P9 C15 2008 Software for
several industries
Seed 50k 2012 2016 BAs, VC,
CoIF
Trade
sale
7 PC
P9 C16 2014 Machine learning
for real estate
Seed 60k 2015 2016 BAs Trade
sale
1.4 PC
P10 C17 2010 Health care Early
stage
45k 2012 2016 BAs Trade
sale
5 AG
(b) Investments by angel groups
P1 C1 1994 Hospitality Seed > 1M 1994 2008 CoIF MBO 1.2 AG
P1 C2 2000 Oil and gas Start-up 80k 2000 2007 BAs Trade
sale
28.5 AG
P4 C7 2001 IT services and
consulting
Start-up 50k 2006 2013 CoIF Trade
sale
8 AG
P5 C8 2008 Music Seed 1M 2011 2013 BAs,
CoIF
Trade
sale
10 AG
P6 C9 2001 Bio-science Start-up 10M 2003 2011 VC Trade
sale
1.2 AG
P6 C10 2004 Business services Start-up – 2005 2014 CoIF Trade
sale
9 AG
a Legend: B—bank, BAs—business angels, CoIF—co-investment fund, VC—venture capital fund, Corp—corporate firm
b Legend: AG—angel group, PC—personal contacts
approach to their investing (Mason and Botelho 2016).
Their approach was based on the ‘folk wisdom’, noted
earlier, that if the investee business was successful, then
there would be no difficulty in finding an exit (Mason
et al. 2016). There is very little evidence to indicate
when business angels do start to think about their exit
or how deeply they think about it. Previous research is
therefore unable to provide clear insights into the atti-
tude of investors towards exit. This study indicates that
in the great majority of the cases (14 out of 17 cases),
angels have a favourable evaluation regarding the be-
haviour, that is, they did think about the exit at the start
of the investment process, contrary to the evidence
reviewed earlier. Investors recognised that they need to
be able to anticipate an exit before investing:
We would not have invested without having an
exit in mind. (C2)
You can’t invest in something before you’ve
thought about how you’re going to get out. (C3)
Yes, I thought about the exit, I thought I would
take it to AIM. (C12)
In just one case, the investor took a contrary view
arguing that rather than focusing on the exit, investors
should be mainly focused on creating value.
I never go into these things with an exit in mind. I
know everybody says you should but I don’t do
that.… I don’t think of the exit. I think of building
value. (C8)
In the two other cases, the investors had a neutral
attitude towards the exit. One investor observed that the
choice of growing the company and creating value
might be easier than thinking about the exit. “The mar-
ket had not developed; the market that was going to buy
us had not developed at that stage so we did not know
how to get out. We thought we had a very good invest-
ment.” (C11). The other angel observed that a focus on
growing the business is not inconsistent with being exit-
focused because “you always think about the exit. You
may not call it that but you are always designing busi-
nesses to be attractive to buyers” (C9). This suggests that
some investors have a neutral attitude about the exit
because they are focused on building the business.
However, this behaviour might be expected, in the lon-
ger term, to achieve the desired outcome of an exit.
In summary, in the majority of cases (14 out of 17
cases), investors exhibited a positive attitude towards
achieving an exit. The drivers for this positive attitude
are related to their desire to recover their investment and
achieve a financial return. However, external factors
(e.g. market development) can impact the attitude of
investors towards the behaviour. The attitude of busi-
ness angels towards exits can be neutral or negative if
they consider that focusing on an exit will make them
lose attention on growing the business. This adds to the
notion of “patient by default” proposed by Harrison
et al. (2016), that is, the lack of exit focus by angel
investors does not mean that they do not have a positive
attitude regarding pursuing an exit, it just means that
they do not prioritise the liquidity event.
4.2 Subjective norms
According to the TPB, intentions are influenced by
subjective norms, that is, how social pressure can impact
the individual’s intentions to perform a specific behav-
iour. The angel is not the only actor involved in the exit.
Their intention to exit is therefore likely to be influenced
by the views of the entrepreneur and also by any co-
investors. In the majority of the cases (15 out of 17
cases), the investor emphasised the importance of hav-
ing the entrepreneur aligned with the angel on the in-
tention to exit. Indeed, a lack of alignment is likely to be
a ‘deal killer’ for exit-centric investors (Mason and
Botelho 2016), making it unlikely that the investment
would go ahead, and represents a significant source of
post-investment conflict (Collewaert 2012). It is there-
fore not surprising to find a reported alignment of inter-
ests regarding the exit in all of the cases. However, as the
following quotes show, the role of the entrepreneur can
vary between, on the one hand, driving the exit and, on
the other hand, simply agreeing with it.
They were keen. Yes. I mean, you should bear in
mind we were actively involved. (C1)
Well, (the entrepreneurs) always started a business
with an exit in mind. (C6)
They were positive. Bear in mind that the team
were academics. They got a big cheque and were
really happy. (C15)
They saw it as something they were very happy
with. (C17)
There were only two cases where the entrepreneurs
did not have a positive impact on the angel’s perception
of achieving an exit. However, these non-positive views
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did not seem to have a significant impact on the subjec-
tive norm of the investor since it did not change their
intention to exit. In one case, the angel commented as
follows:
I think they (the management team) were a little
bit disappointed. ….. I think they probably felt
they wanted to build a bigger company. (C8)
Business angels often invest alongside other inves-
tors or their investee businesses may raise follow-on
finance from other investors. This means that business
angels typically interact with other investors, such as
venture capital funds, in their investee companies
(Meglio et al. 2017; Zhang et al. 2011). Hence, a second
dimension of subjective norm measures how other in-
vestors impacted the angel’s intention of achieving an
exit. All the exit cases included at least one additional
investor (see Table 1). In the majority of cases (13 out of
17 cases), these investors also had a positive impact on
the angel’s subjective norm regarding the exit.
Other investors like X (business angel) just said
you do it and let me knowwhat the answer is. (C2)
The VCs played a significant role alongside the
angels on achieving the exit. (C13)
The other investors were also on the board so they
were very supportive. (C15)
However, the effect of other investors was not always
as positive. In 4 of the 17 exits, the impact of other
investors on the subject norm was neutral. In two cases,
this was due to the lack of involvement (exit or post-
investment) from the other investors.
They (the Co-fund) were not involved. I felt they
had nothing to say about the exit. (C1)
The whole deal could have been made without
them (corporate firm), their position (5%) was
immaterial. (C14)
This evidence indicates that the intentions of business
angels to achieve an exit are positively impacted by
social pressure. In the majority of cases, both the entre-
preneurs (14 out of 17 cases) and co-investors (13 out of
17 cases) have a positive impact on the views of angels
about the exit. When business angels feel that other
actors also want an exit, this serves to validate their
own exit intentions. This supports Collewaert’s (2012)
work on how interactions between entrepreneurs and
angel investors can positively impact exit intentions.
This study extends this conclusion by highlighting that
other investors can also have a positive effect on angels’
intention to exit.
4.3 Perceived behavioural control
In TPB, the measure of an individual’s perception of
their aptitude to execute a specific task is understood as
perceived behavioural control. This research evaluated
this factor at two levels: (i) to what extent did the angels
believe they were in control of the exit process (i.e. how
much, if any, external support was necessary to achieve
an exit); and (ii) how difficult was it to realise an exit
(i.e. what challenges did the angel encounter in the exit
process)?
In a majority of cases (9 out of 17 cases), the business
angels were positive about their ability to achieve the
exit. Typically, angel investors were of the view that
they could be helpful in the exit process. These contri-
butions occur at different stages of the exit process.
We got one of our investors involved to help them
(management team) get ready for an exit. (C2)
Me and my fellow non-executive director, the
finance guy, have been playing good cop bad
cop in the negotiation process. (C5)
We (angels) approached the buyer and were suc-
cessful. Angel Y did the introduction, angel X and
I did most of the selling. (C11)
However, in a significant minority of cases (8 out of
17 cases), investors had negative attitudes about their
ability to help the investee company to achieve an exit.
In these cases, investors felt that they needed external
support to be able to achieve the exit as they did not have
the requisite knowledge, network or ability (Frey et al.
2011). The most common type of support was therefore
to bring in external expertise that had the capability to
identify and introduce a buyer for the company.
The company appointed a non-executive who was
a deal maker, he was very instrumental when we
did the sale. (C4)
Basically, at that stage a corporate financier was
retained by the Board and they helped to drive the
process. (C8)
We had a considerable help from an USA corpo-
rate finance boutique to ensure that we had more
than one buyer. We wanted to have a bidding war.
(C14)
This evidence indicates that although in the majority
of cases the business angels considered themselves ca-
pable of helping in an exit process, there were a signif-
icant number of situations where angels had a negative
perception of their ability to perform the task. In these
situations, external expertise was sought.
The second measure used to evaluate perceived be-
havioural control was the difficulty that angels experi-
enced in performing the task of achieving an exit. Typ-
ically, angels had positive views about the challenges of
achieving exit. In 10 of the 17 cases, the angels made
positive comments about the exit process.
The intention was to continue to build the business
and essentially find an exit at some point, but it
just helped. (C5)
I was not worried about the exit, I could not see
what that exit was going to be but it was clear to
see that an exit would happen given the scale
opportunity. (C13)
There was a thought of an exit when the Spanish
corporate came on board but then in a trade show
we met the final buyer, we felt it was so easy to
attract interest. (C14)
However, in seven of the cases (41%), investors had
a negative view about the exit process, seeing it as being
a considerable challenge. There are various reasons why
they held such views. In some cases, the investors
considered that it took too long to achieve the exit
We were trying to get out for a long time, remem-
ber, we did tried to sell it in 97/98 (ten years
earlier). (C1)
It was profitable, but it was just very difficult to
achieve. An easier exit would have been achieved
by changing the strategy on the business about
three years before we sold it. (C9)
The exit in this case would always have beenmore
likely a trade sale. We did actually explore some
other mergers earlier on when it became obvious
that, actually, to grow it was hard because it was
such a regulated environment. (C17)
This evidence clearly indicates that perceived behav-
ioural control is the weaker factor influencing the inten-
tions to exit. Not only do many investors perceive the
exit process to be hard but they also do not feel prepared
to deal with it. Even in successful exits, some investors
had a negative perception about their ability to perform
the task. This can be explained by the complexity and
uncertainty associated to the exit process (Wennberg
and DeTienne 2014).
4.4 Intention
In TPB, intention is assumed to be the immediate ante-
cedent of behaviour. Ajzen (1991) observed that “the
stronger the intention to engage in a behaviour, the more
likely should be its performance” (p. 181). In this study,
angels have performed the behaviour; hence, it could
mean that they had positive intentions regarding an exit.
In the majority of cases (12 out of 17 cases), this was
confirmed: investors had a clear positive intention to
exit the investment before performing the behaviour.
We had been trying to get out for a long time. And
our target was there. (C1)
Well, we wanted to be aligned with management
and management wanted an exit. And we wanted
an exit because you’ve got to have some exits.
(C2)
The company was exitable, that is, it was acquir-
able and we wanted to exit…ultimately as an
angel investor you need your money back. (C14)
Some exits (5 of 17) were made reluctantly in order
to solve a problem with the investment. Ajzen (1991)
observes that intentions will match behaviour only when
the behaviour is under volitional control, a situation in
which an individual can decide what to do. In two cases,
the investors indicated that they did not intend to exit,
although as an exit was achieved, it was not unwelcome.
One situation in which this lack of volitional control
could arise is a conflict between the entrepreneur and the
angel, prompting the angel to seek an exit even though
there was no desire to do so:
It was either the CEO or myself leaving the com-
pany and I thought it would be better for the
company for him to stay. (C12)
The entrepreneurs copped out, they thought they
were not going to be able to grow the business.
This was disappointing. (C16)
The lack of financial alternatives to meet the funding
needs of the business also is another factor that may also
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prompt an angel to seek an exit even though this was not
desired.
We were trying to raise money to ramp up pro-
duction and it was really hard to because we could
not get debt funding. (C8)
They knew, as I did, that the business was not
delivering and to take it to profitability would
have required a substantially greater investment.
… So, we knew between us we had no choice but
to sell it. (C9)
The exit, in the end, was one that was brought
about by necessity rather than a plan; they just
need big bugs to overcome the regulated environ-
ment. (C17)
In summary, in the great majority of cases, angel
investors had positive intentions to achieve an exit.
However, in a minority of cases (3 out of 17), business
angels did not have the intention to exit but were pushed
to do so by other factors. Performing this behaviour
without having an intention to do so is associated with
the uncertainty of the entrepreneurial process which
gives investors no option other than to exit (e.g. unmet
funding requirements, de-motivated entrepreneurs, con-
flicts between investors and entrepreneurs, etc).
4.5 Summary
The influence of each of the dimensions of TPB is
summarised in Table 3. It is clear that the factor with
the lowest positive effect is perceived behavioural con-
trol. Indeed, this is the only dimension where there is not
a strong positive effect. The explanation for this may be
that angels consider exits to be difficult to achieve and
doubt their ability to achieve this outcome. This evi-
dence that angels demonstrate both lack of efficacy and
unfavourable facilitating conditions suggests the merits
of adopting in future research a decomposed TPB (Fig.
3). Based on the argument that belief structures are not
monolithic, a decomposed TPB has been proposed
(Taylor and Todd 1995) as the basis for making clearer
the relationships involved (Fig. 3). Attitudinal belief
structures are seen as the outcome of relative advantage
(the benefits to the investor, such that the higher the
benefits, the stronger the attitude), complexity (the de-
gree to which the exit is perceived to be difficult, where
complexity is negatively related to behaviour) and com-
patibility (the degree to which the exit fits with the
angel’s existing values, previous experience and current
needs). Subjective norms will be influenced by a range
of normative influences; to the extent that there are
substantial differences of opinion amongst significant
referents, the influence of subjective norms on inten-
tions will vary. Finally, and following Ajzen’s (1988,
1991) original formulation, PBC can be decomposed
into facilitating conditions (externally based resource
constraints, time and money) and self-efficacy (the in-
ternally related dimension related to ability or perceived
self-efficacy).
Our findings extend our current knowledge on the
way business angels look at exits, in particular, demon-
strating that the majority of positive exits are planned
decisions. However, while providing new evidence on
the place of these four themes in the exit process, it
leaves unanswered the question if exits are achieved as
a result of a proactive strategy by the angel. The next
section therefore examines the activities that angels
undertake to facilitate the exit.
4.6 Exit strategy: proactive vs. opportunistic
The practitioner literature suggests that business angels
can increase the likelihood of an exit through the adop-
tion of an exit-centric strategy (Mason et al. 2015). But
there is no evidence on the extent to which successful
exits are the result of proactive exit strategies. In a
majority of the cases analysed in this study (10 out of
17), the investor had a proactive approach towards the
exit. This is defined as the set of actions designed to
prepare a venture to be ‘exitable’. In this approach, the
entrepreneur and the investor(s) take active steps to
Table 3 Fit of theory of planned behaviour
Positive Neutral Negative
n % n % n %
Attitude
Exit process 14 82 2 12 1 6
Subjective norm
Entrepreneurs 15 88 2 12 0 0
Other investors 13 76 4 24 0 0
Perceived behavioural control
Involvement 9 53 0 0 8 47
Difficult 10 59 0 0 7 41
Intentions
To exit 12 71 2 12 3 18
achieve an exit, such as signalling to the market they are
an acquisition target, identifying a potential buyer and
developing close relationships with external
stakeholders.
I mean, one of the best ways of getting an exit is if
the management pick up the word on the grape-
vine that some companies have cash and others
haven’t got, and they are buying or not buying.
(C1)
We spoke to all the people.We spoke to a potential
buyer, obviously, and we gave them a very clear
steer that said ‘look we are going to get bought.
(C4)
Quite often, a good way of getting an exit is to
have a partnership first to see if you can work
together. Get them excited. Get them seeing the
reason why they should buy. (C13)
An alternative course of action is the opportunistic
approach. This is defined as a set of actions that have the
objective of making the venture as appealing as possible
to potential buyers but without taking actions, like those
discussed above, to proactively seek a buyer. In this
approach, the priority of both the entrepreneur and the
investor(s) is to grow the business rather than seeking an
exit but with the expectation that in due course this will
attract interest from potential acquirers Typically, this
strategy puts the investee business in the position of
relying on an approach from a buyer instead of looking
for an exit.
Well we weren’t really thinking about it [an exit]
as such. I mean the intention was just to build the
business. ... The intention was to continue to build
the business and essentially find an exit at some
point, but there was no particular time table on
that. (C5)
We always think about the exit. But the way this
one happened was it was opportunistic in the
sense that the buyer appeared out of nowhere.
(C10)
The exit came to us because we had a business that
was attractive. …it had been made attractive and
that’s the key part of strategic planning, you have
to make things that buyers want to buy. (C14)
In summary, a proactive exit strategy comprises a com-
bination of strategic actions to identify and attract a specific
buyer or buyers for the company. In this approach, the
entrepreneur and the investor(s) are driven by the thought
of achieving an exit. An opportunisitic strategy is defined
as the set of actions that have the objective of growing the
venture and, as a result, making it as appealing as possible
to potential buyers. In this approach, the entrepreneur and
the investor(s) are driven by the thought of growing the
business rather than achieving an exit. An opportunistic
approach can be a viable alternative to a proactive exit
strategy as a means of achieving an exit (Fig. 4). This
generates two further questions. What is the impact of
these different strategies in terms of financial returns?
And, what is the effect of having positive intentions to
perform the behaviour in terms of return? These issues are
considered in the next section.
4.7 Typology of exits
It is clear from the preceding discussion that exits occur
in a variety of circumstances, for various reasons and
with varying outcomes. As a conceptual contribution,
this final section of the paper proposes a typology of
angel-backed investment exits. The variables chosen
reflect both the theoretical framework used in this study
as well as the strategies that emerged from the data: the
intentions to exit and the strategy undertaken by the
angel. The exit intentions were divided into two groups:
intended (positive intention) and unintended (neutral or
negative intention). The strategy undertaken is defined
as before: proactive or opportunistic. This is
summarised in Fig. 5. The clusters are also profiled in
terms of average returns and holding period. These
profiles enable a comparison to be made across exit
strategies and exit motivations.
The first cluster comprises all of the investments
where the exit was intended by the angel investors and
the angel adopted a proactive exit strategy. This is the
classic planned exit. The exits in this cluster had returns
that ranged from 1.2 to 28.5 times the initial investment,
with an average return of 14.11 times. The average
holding period was 8.14 years. The second cluster rep-
resents the investments where the business angel had the
intention to exit but had an opportunistic strategy. In this
case, the investor intended to seek an exit but the strat-
egy that followed was to grow the venture rather focus-
ing on the exit. This type of exit had returns that ranged
from 4 to 9 times the initial investment, with an average
return of 6.8 times. The average holding period of these
investments was 6.4 years.
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The third cluster comprised investments where the
angel had a proactive exit strategy but had no intention
to exit the investment. In other words, the investor was
not seeking an exit at that that point in time, but was
preparing the venture to achieve an exit at a later point in
time. This was typically the result of circumstances
dictating the need for an urgent exit. There were three
cases of this type of exit. The average return for this
group of investments was 1.23 times with a holding
period of 6.33 years.
The final cluster comprised investments where the
angel had no intention to exit but was able to achieve an
opportunistic exit. These exits were therefore an unin-
tended outcome of a strategy focused on growth rather
than exit. There were only two cases of this type of exit.
The average return was 7.5 times the investment and the
holding period was 3 years.
It is significant that the cluster with the highest average
return is the one where the angels had both the intention
to achieve an exit and adopted a proactive exit strategy.
This seems intuitive: angels are rewarded for preparing an
exit and searching for a buyer with a higher return. If the
objective is to minimise the holding period, then an
opportunistic strategy combined with no intention to exit
at that particular point in time appears to be the best
combination. In these cases, the angel did not make this
strategic decision but was forced to exit because of
funding difficulties faced by the investee firms.
5 Conclusion
This is the first research study to examine how exits by
business angels occur. It supports the proposition that
TPB is a suitable theoretical framework to conceptualise
the exit process of angel investments. The evidence
shows, first, that exits are in most cases the outcome of
planned behaviour, and second, that most angels have
adopted a proactive exit strategy, often developing close
links with companies identified as being potential
Fig. 3 Theory of planned
behaviour with belief
decomposition and crossover
effects. Source: Shih and Fang
(2004), based on Taylor and Todd
(1995)
Event Investment Appraisal Post-investment relationship Future rounds Exit process Exit
Based on Amatucci and Sohl (2004) model
Driven by a 
third party
Actions
Actions
Stage
Focused on gaining a position in 
the market place (opportunistic)
Driven by the thought of an exit
Driven by other criterion
Pre-Investment
Contract/Negotiation 
agreement
Post-investment relationship, future rounds, exit
Focused on a potential buyer 
(pro-active)
Too early to think about it
Initial thoughts about the exit 
(who, when, how much, etc…) 
Unintended (approached by the buyer)
Intended (approached the buyer)
Angel driven
Failure of achieving the exit
Re-focus on a new buyer
Keep on growing
Fig. 4 Business angels’ investment process, exit strategies and actions
acquirers. However, some exits are opportunistic and
can occur even though an investor has no intention of
achieving such an outcome at that time and following an
unsolicited approach by an interested buyer. In these
cases, investors might be forced into an exit because of
factors that are either internal or external to the investee
business, or may simply be due to investment fatigue.
The study also indicates that a key reason why business
angels do not adopt an exit-centric approach to their
investments is because of low PBC—in other words,
they attribute a high level of complexity to the task and
therefore develop a lack of confidence to perform it.
We re-emphasise that our application of TPB is as a
heuristic device, used to provide the basis for under-
standing of the business angel exit decision-making
process, not as an explanatory framework which we
formally test. However, our conclusions are consistent
with recent longitudinal research which goes beyond the
expanding stream of scholarship (see Lortie and
Castrogiovanni 2015) explaining the formation of en-
trepreneurial intentions to examine whether the inten-
tion to start a business measured at one point of time
translates into subsequent entrepreneurial behaviour
(Kautonen et al. 2013). Their results support the predic-
tions outlined in the TPB: first, attitude, perceived be-
havioural control and subjective norms are significant
predictors of entrepreneurial intention; and second,
intention and perceived behavioural control are
significant predictors of subsequent behaviour.
Kautonen et al. (2013) conclude that their research
supports the application of TPB and the concept of
behavioural intention to understand the emergence of
complex economic behaviour such as entrepreneurial
exits prior to the onset of any observable action
(Kautonen et al. 2013). This conclusion is significant
for the policy community given the importance of exits
for the state as investor (Munari and Toschi 2014). In
our discussion, we recognise that while the exit may be
intended by the angel investor, and those intentions may
indeed be shaped according to the TPB (although our
results show a relatively weak relation between per-
ceived behaviour control and intentions), investors
may not have control over the timing of that exit. In
other words, in Ajzen’s (1991) terms, actual (rather than
perceived) behavioural control may be a significant
influence on the conversion of intention into behaviour.
One of the challenges for entrepreneurship research
seeking to develop and use TPB as a framework is the
adequate operationalisation of the relationship between
intentions and behaviour: we have, to a greater or lesser
extent, a viable TPB-based theory of entrepreneurial
intentions (Krueger and Carsrud 1993; Brännback
et al. 2017); we do not yet have a fully specified TPB-
based theory of entrepreneurial intentions and behav-
iour. For research in this vein to continue, there is a need
to address the issue of research design and methodology
posed by longitudinal research and also respond to the
challenge of specifying, conceptually and operationally,
the constituent elements of ‘actual behavioural control’.
By following this strategy, it will be possible to address
three obvious limitations of the present study. First, it is
based on a small number of cases. While small number of
cross-case comparison research designs can have explana-
tory power (Garg and Eisenhardt 2017), a larger sample
would illuminatemore aspects of the process, especially the
role of actual behavioural control. Further work should
therefore be undertaken on exploring business angel views
on the exit process. Second, it is based entirely on the
angels’ view of the exit. Future research should seek to
triangulate the views of angels with those of the entrepre-
neurs and the executives of the acquiring firm to assess the
dynamic inter-relationships amongst the various parties
involved (particularly around the congruence of interests,
conflict and goal alignment), which are important in under-
standing the relationship between intentions and outcomes.
Third, it only looked at successful outcomes—investments
Strategy
Pro-active Opportunistic
Exit 
Intentions
Intended
Cluster 1
C1, C2, C3, C4, C6, C11, C13
Cluster 2
C5,C7,C10, C14, C15
Unintended
Cluster 3
C9, C12, C16
Cluster 4
C8, C17
Fig. 5 Categorisation of angel
exits
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that achieved a positive financial return. Angels also have
investments from which they have not exited; these are
likely to be dominated by ‘zombie companies’ that are
performing sufficiently well to survive but with no prospect
of attracting a buyer. This raises further questions that future
research needs to address. First, do different outcomes
reflect the situationally specific operation of actual behav-
ioural control or the adoption of an entirely different exit
strategy? Second, although intention models such as TPB
allow us to better understand the impact of various ante-
cedents of entrepreneurial behaviour, identifying not only
what influences this, but also how (Krueger and Carsrud
1993), they stop short of actually accounting for behaviour
itself. It is therefore also necessary to develop to the same
level our understanding of the specifics of the relation
between intentions and behaviour. Third, our analysis fo-
cuses on the behaviour of the angel investor to achieve an
exit rather than the processual actions required for the
process itself to unfold. Hence, future research into the role
of the investor in the exit process should adopt a process-
based framework (Hjorth et al. 2015).
The study also has implications for practice. First, it
provides empirical support for the growing emphasis in
the practitioner literature on the need for investors to
adopt an exit-centric investment strategy with a proac-
tive approach to the exit. Not only is this the way in
which the majority of exits occur, but it also generates
the highest average returns. Second, it highlights the
need for angels’ associations and support organisations
to provide angels with training on exits.3
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